CHRISTIAN STOKKE Discursive struggle in the Mohammed cartoon affair A critical discourse analysis of the media coverage of the Muslim demonstration in Oslo Paper submitted for PhD course in Critical Discourse Analysis Örebro University, September 2009 The Prime Minister: “I am terribly sorry that “Magazinet” has offended Muslim feelings, Mr. Imam… But we are a nation of proud democrats, so we are offended by the Arab aggression and doubts about our unprejudiced compassion… so let‟s call it a draw ..?” [Cartoon commenting on the Norwegian government‟s attempt to reconcile “Magazinet”, which printed the Mohammed cartoons, and Muslim community leaders, 10 February 2006. Printed in newspaper Klassekampen.] “Politicians and media; this is the result of your irresponsibility” “Shame on you, media; for harassing and spreading hatred” [From the Muslim protest in Oslo, 11 February 2006, against the publication of the caricatures of Prophet Mohammed. Printed on the cover of the International Socialists‟ Norwegian magazine, Gnisten] INTRODUCTION The so-called Mohammed cartoon crisis erupted in January 2006, after a small Norwegian magazine, the conservative Christian “Magazinet” reprinted the caricatures of Prophet Mohammed originally published in the Danish daily newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, in the autumn of 2005. The republication of the cartoons led to an international crisis, which culminated when the Norwegian Embassy in Damascus, Syria, was burned down by angry protesters on February 4, 2006. At this time, Danish and Norwegian flags had been burned during protests against the caricatures of the Prophet in several countries in the Middle East. In the book “The European public sphere and the Media”, Anna Triandafyllidou et al. (2009) argue that “moments of crisis are crucial for the ethically based negotiation of Europe and/or the nation(-state)” (p. 6). Despite the Europeanization of national media (p. 3), national political elites are more significant for framing coverage than supranational ones (p.38). The Mohammed cartoon affair, which was not really an event, but a crisis constructed by the media (p. 239), is one such example where European states negotiate their national identities as Europeans and define their common values against an external „other‟, „Islam‟. The Danish and Norwegian governments had quite different approaches to respond to the complaints of Muslims worldwide. As the illustrations on the front page indicate, the Norwegian government, represented by Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and then Minister of Labor and Social Inclusion, Bjarne Håkon Hanssen, arranged a „reconciliation meeting‟ to make peace between Magazinet editor Vebjørn Selbekk, and the Norwegian Muslim community, represented by the head of the Islamic Council in Norway, Mohammed Hamdan, on 10 February 2006. Selbekk regretted the consequences of the publication, Hamdan accepted this “apology” and called off further protests, and the two men shook hands. The same afternoon, the Antiracist Center together with 60 other organizations, although none of them Muslim, arranged a peace demonstration, where about 300, mostly non-Muslim, persons attended, including several cabinet ministers and other politicians. The government had made Magazinet the scapegoat (Steien 2007:42), and the crisis was apparently over. An independent group of Norwegian Muslims, who called themselves “The Volunteers”, however, decided to go through with their planned protest against the caricatures on 11 February 2006, a demonstration that had first been announced more than a week earlier, on February 3, 2006. This group was not satisfied with the Norwegian government‟s blaming the crisis on Selbekk and Magazinet alone. Neither were they happy with their community leaders who had accepted this partial solution to the issue and called off further protests. They saw the crisis in a broader context, not restricted to Magazinet or blasphemy. The cartoons were instead seen as the drop that made the cup run over, adding to years of racist harassment and demonization of Muslims in the media, with politicians standing by doing nothing or adding their own contributions. The protest took place - peacefully - with 1 500 people marching through the streets, at 2.30 p.m. on a Saturday afternoon in the Muslim-dominated neighborhood of Grønland just east of central Oslo, to Parliament, where a number of appeals were held. This time, most of them were Norwegian Muslims, although all the Muslim community organizations had advised against participation. Only a few non-Muslims joined. Aim and scope of the article The objective of this paper is to explore the discursive struggles that takes place when hegemonic ideologies are challenges by counter-narratives. The Muslim demonstration was an opportunity to let their voices be heard for many ordinary Norwegian Muslims, who had not previously gained access to the media, and whose views, it turned out, were not represented by their community leaders either. Up to this point, the media had primarily represented the struggle between two dominant ideological positions – i.e. the populist right 2 that insisted that freedom of expression was absolute and included the right to offend, and the official Norwegian liberal (or social-democratic) policy of dialogue and reconciliation between the „two sides‟ of the conflict (Steien 2007:44-45). Solveig Steien (2007:44) writes: “The discursive struggle is also relevant for analysis of how Muslim voices are presented. Are they, for example, representing themselves, or a group or “Norwegian Muslims in general”?” In the media, Muslim complaints about the caricatures being offensive were often reduced to complaints about blasphemy, whose legitimacy was easily dismissed in a highly secularized society. While it is true that a number of Norwegian Muslims have asked for the dormant law paragraph against blasphemy to be enforced (Steien 2007:45), the demonstration on 11 February 2006, revealed that many Norwegian Muslims are worried over the much wider context of anti-Muslim racism in the media.1 Steien (2007:46) discusses the lack of Muslim voices in general public debates about the Mohammed cartoons. The coverage of the protest, however, allowed Norwegian Muslims to have their voices heard to some extent. In order to explore the discursive struggles between hegemonic ideologies and counter-narratives in the Mohammed cartoon affair, I will do a critical discourse analysis of the media coverage before and after the two demonstrations in Oslo on Friday 10 and Saturday 11 February 2006.2 Methodology According to Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, critical discourse analysis “sees „language as social practice‟ […] and considers the „context of language use‟ to be crucial” (2009:5). In line with this, I see discourse as social interaction, but while using an actor-oriented approach, I tend to agree with Foucault on the power of discourse and structure over agency. This, of course, does not rule out the possibility of resistance, but as Talal Asad (2003:70-72) warns, we should not romanticize resistance in our eagerness to ascribe agency to individuals and groups. While individual actors do have a degree of „free choice‟ in their discursive interaction, empirical data shows that the unconscious influence of hegemonic discourses in determining individual action is often surprisingly strong, to the extent that we can speak about individual actors “reproducing” dominant discourses. This applies more often to actors from the majority and/or elite, who are less inclined to challenge the dominant ideology, and often rearticulate and reconfirm hegemonic ideologies when these are challenged. Anthropologist Marianne Gullestad (2006:194-195) sees public debate as a discursive struggle, where hegemony is challenged by counter-narratives, and then rearticulated and reconfirmed when majority opinions emerge as neutral and minority voices are attempted marginalized. In the case analyzed in this paper, the official Norwegian government policy of dialogue appears as a neutral ground between „extremists on both sides‟, and the voices of Muslim protest are largely marginalized although they are heard more clearly through the coverage of the demonstration than before and after. The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) associated with Ruth Wodak, aims to “demystify the hegemony of specific discourses by deciphering the ideologies that establish, perpetuate or fight dominance” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:88) and “should make the object under investigation and the analyst‟s own position transparent and justify theoretically why certain interpretations and readings of discursive events seem more valid than others” (ibid.). 1 According to Dag Herbjørnsrud (Ny Tid, 16 March 2007), the letter written by 11 ambassadors of Muslim countries to Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen in October 2005, when he rejected their request for a meeting, was misrepresented in the media. While media used the letter as proof that the ambassadors requested the Prime Minister to intervene and stop Jyllands-Posten, the letter did not contain specific demands. Rather, the ambassadors requested a meeting to discuss the general anti-Muslim racism in Danish public discourse. 2 For the broader context of the Mohammed cartoon crisis in general, I refer to two good analyses with an international perspective, Kunelius et al. (2007) and Eide et al. (2009). 3 Critical Discourse Analysis is problem-oriented and allows the researcher to choose the methodology that best fits the object of study. As an anthropologist, my approach is inspired by Marianne Gullestad (2002, 2006), who uses the term “interpretive analysis” to describe her analysis of public debate, where she selects examples of typical arguments that show the development of the debate over time (Gullestad 2006:194-195). Ruth Wodak (2008:1) writes in this regard that “usually, in the social sciences, text sequences are used as illustrations, sentences are taken out of context, and specific text sequences are used to validate or reject claims without relating them to the entire textual material and without providing any explicit justification or external evidence for their selection”. I attempt to follow Wodak‟s advice by starting my analysis with the selected texts in full, rather than using text sequences primarily to illustrate my points. I also use a wider range of quotes from the selected texts, which allows for seeing the quotes in a broader context and a more inductive approach that reduces the risk of simply confirming or rejecting predefined theoretical assumptions. I contextualize the material on different levels; within the text, between texts, between discourses, as well as the wider socio-political context, in order to meet my objective of exploring discursive struggles. I will first do a micro-level analysis of selected newspaper articles, before I attempt to draw some conclusions about discursive struggle, hegemonic ideologies and counternarratives towards the end. My approach is thus inductive rather than deductive. DHA follows the “principle of triangulation, which implies taking a whole range of empirical observations, theories and methods as a well as background information into account” (Reisigl & Wodak 2009:89). I use triangulation when I compare how events are reported in different newspaper articles and compare the coverage to what the accompanying pictures can tells us about the event in visual terms, as well as what participants say in interviews and commentaries. I use the linguistic categories used by Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak (2001:45-85). In their linguistic analysis of racist discourse, they investigate five discursive strategies; (1) referential and (2) predicational strategies (how persons are named and referred to, and which positive or negative characteristics are attributed to them), (3) what argumentation strategies, including fallacies (violations of the „rules‟ of rational discourse) and topoi (parts of argumentation that belong to explicit or inferable premises), are used to justify discrimination (4) perspectivation and framing (from what point of view are these expressed), and (5) intensifying and mitigating strategies (how discriminatory statements are articulated). Selection of texts The selected texts are taken from major Norwegian newspapers in the period from 3-12 February 2006, from the initial announcement until the day after the protest. My sample includes most articles covering the Muslim protest, as well as the “peace demonstration”. The 14 articles are taken from the following national Norwegian daily newspapers: Newspaper Aftenposten Dagsavisen Klassekampen Dagbladet Type subscription subscription subscription tabloid Political leaning conservative social-democratic left-wing liberal Version Circulation No. articles print 300 000 2* print 30 000 4 print 10 000 1 print 200 000 2 Online 2 VG tabloid right-wing populist Online 3 Print 350 000 ** *One of these is from the afternoon issue “Aften” – which serves as Oslo‟s local newspaper. **VG‟s print version is not included as most of its printed material is also published online. There does not seem to be any systematic correlation between the newspapers‟ political affiliation or whether it is a tabloid or „serious‟ paper, and a more or less favourable coverage of minority voices. However, some newspapers, such as Dagsavisen show more interest in 4 reporting minority issues, while others, such as Aftenposten and Klassekampen report less on minority issues, but prefer to debate minority issues. It also seems that minority journalists sometimes show a more in-depth understanding of minorities and let their voices be heard to a greater extent. This does not need to be intentional, but could simply be a consequence of the journalists‟ personal networks. Many majority persons, journalists included, lack networks within minority communities and are thus more likely to reproduce majority prejudices. I have not included editorials and with a few exceptions, newspaper commentaries. See Solveig Steien (2008) for a study of Norwegian editorials and commentaries on the caricature crisis. THEMATIC ANALYSIS In this section, I will analyze 14 selected newspaper articles that cover the demonstration. The analysis is thematic and organized around certain topics and themes, which often follow a historical development. Within each theme, relevant content from several articles will be compared. While some content from the selected articles has been omitted, the topics cover most of the content. The thematic analysis is divided into three sections: Coverage before the demonstrations (7 articles), coverage of the “peace demonstration” 10 February (2 articles), and coverage of the Muslim protest, 11 February (5 articles). Initial announcement The first public announcement that Norwegian Muslims were planning a demonstration against the Mohammed cartoons appeared in VG online, 3 February 2006. Besides being the first article to mention the Muslim protest, this article is remarkable in its positive representation of Norwegian Muslims. In terms of perspectivation and framing, the frequent use of direct quotes expresses involvement rather than detachment (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:81), and can be seen in connection with the fact that the article is written by a journalist with a Muslim background, Kadafi Zaman. The article carries the positive headline, Inviting to a demonstration, and continues: Norwegian Muslims distribute flyers in mosques on Friday to invite people to a demonstration against the Mohammed insults. Linguistically, the actors are referred to by a culturalizing term (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:51), but in this context, nationality and religion do have relevance and the term „Norwegian Muslims‟ is preferred by group members themselves and thus the most „correct‟ term to apply (ibid. p. 69). The predicational term „invite‟ is clearly positive and indicates that the actors are open-minded and that the public is welcome to join the protest. A flyer distributed at the Friday prayer at the Islamic Culture Center, is quoted: Because of the insults against the Prophet, we hold a demonstration on Saturday 11 February at 2.30 p.m. at Grønlands Torg. The referential term here is the deictic collectivization „we‟, which refers to another referential term, the signature on the flyer: The Volunteers. This term is a „political actionalization‟ (ibid. p. 51), referring to persons in terms of their political activities, which already implies a positive predicational term (ibid. p. 45), „volunteering‟ which connotes agency, initiative, social responsibility and generosity. The following slogans are quoted from the flyer:    Are you fed up with media‟s abuse of freedom of expression? How long shall they offend and provoke to divide society? Unite and show how respect should be The second slogan contains the highly significant deictic collectivization „they‟, which can be assumed to refer back to „media‟ in the first slogan. The Norwegian Muslim protest thus seems to be directed primarily at the media while Muslims in some other countries including England directed their protest at „Europe‟ (Triandafyllidou et al. 2009:246;249). The quoted slogans are articulated within a language of „integration‟ – defined not as assimilation (as Norwegian politicians and media most often use the term), but as a mutual process of 5 intercultural understanding and respect, where freedom of expression should be used responsibly to avoid provocations that divide society. In terms of argumentation strategies, the Volunteers here invoke the topos of responsibility, which implies that because an agent (the „media‟) is responsible for a certain problem; they should act towards a solution (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:78). A topos of urgency can be identified in the terms „fed up‟ and „how long‟, implying that if one is unhappy with a situation, one should take immediate action. Note that while the flyer justifies the protest with a reference to the „insults against the prophet‟, none of the slogans quoted mention the caricatures, but refer to media‟s insults, provocations and lack of respect in more general terms. The arguments are thus more in line with the ideological position that sees the caricatures as racism rather than as blasphemy. In the following week, a newspapers reported on opinions towards the demonstration from Norwegian Muslims, both community leaders and individuals. Some voices publicly expressed support for the demonstration. An interesting article in Dagsavisen 6 February quotes a member of a Muslim congregation supporting the protest – but he later makes clear that he does not speak on behalf of the religious community. The article reads, Spokesperson Mehtab Afsar at the congregation Minhaj-ul-Quran says they urge Muslims to take part in the demonstration. Afsar is quoted: We do this for two reasons: First, we think it is important to send a signal to the larger society about how offended Muslims are by this case, and second to show that it is possible to use peaceful means such as the right to demonstrate. The discourse representation in this article is also one of involvement, expressed through the use of direct quotes so that the newspaper gives voice to a counter-hegemonic view. Afsar speaks the language of politics: He wants to „send a signal‟, and try to correct the stereotype of Muslims being violent and aggressive, when saying, „it is possible to use peaceful means‟, and finally refers to „the right to demonstrate‟ – pointing out that „freedom of expression‟ is a right to which Muslims are also entitled. The next day in the same newspaper, Afsar further clarifies his position, As a private citizen, I think all Muslims are entitled to take part in a peaceful demonstration, and I will also do so myself. He makes it clear that he speaks as an individual, and not as a representative of the mosque. He is quoted: It is not the mosque that is behind this demonstration, and the congregation board has not taken a position. While speaking as a private citizen, he may have been constructed by the media as a „spokesperson‟ in the first article. The term “spokesperson” in this context simply means a person who is willing to speak to the media. For years, the media has been looking out for “spokespersons” in the Muslim community, and turned those willing to be interviewed, into representatives of their community, although they only speak as individuals. This has been so widespread in other debates involving Norwegian Muslims, that the lawyer and now Liberal Party politician, Abid Raja, who has had this role for a decade, used the term Spokesman as the title of his 2008 autobiography. Negative reactions from Muslim leaders The article from VG online 3 February, bringing the initial announcement, also reports reactions from Muslim leaders. The quotes from imam Mehboob ur-Rahman at the Islamic Cultural Center are remarkable in expressing acceptance of hegemonic representations of Muslims and submissiveness to Norwegian authorities. He is quoted; Muslims must not get agitated. Evil must be fought with good. Use your head and control your emotions. Perhaps the phrase should be interpreted positively in a religious context, as suggested by the line, „evil must be fought with good‟. However, in the present political context, he also attributes to „Muslims‟ the prejudiced negative traits of being „agitated‟ (which may also connote „aggressive‟) and „emotion[al]‟, which are common racist stereotypes (ibid. p. 53-54, Triandafyllidou et al. 2009:243-244, Richardson 2004:121). The phrase „use your head and control your emotions‟ appears as patronizing when said by an authority figure to discourage 6 political protest. It is typical of sexist/patriarchal discourse and racist/Eurocentric discourse, which implies that the white man is rational and the Other (women, blacks, Muslims) is emotional, and that the rational white man must be in control. The word „control‟ may also be interpreted in this meaning as the imam „uses his head‟ to rationalize submissiveness and „control‟ those who want to act on their “instinct” to protest against injustice. His statement can be seen as an attempt to please Norwegian authorities in the context of a „managerial multiculturalism‟ (Hage 1998), which continues a colonial strategy where authorities of „white nations‟ cooperate with „indigenous‟ authorities to control their communities. The article states that the imam met the foreign minister the same day, and he is quoted; we fully understand their [the government‟s] reaction and are very satisfied with the response. He is also quoted: This [the cartoon crisis] is because of one man [Magazinet editor Vebjørn Selbekk] and not Norway. In the quotes, Ur-Rahman uses a number of intensifying strategies expressed linguistically by words like „fully understand‟ and „very satisfied‟. He seems eager to prove his agreement and acceptance of the dominant ideological position of the Norwegian government, and also accepts the government‟s argumentation strategy of blaming the Magazinet editor. Besides reflecting a narrow understanding of the issue, using Magazinet as a scapegoat is part of a strategy of positive self-presentation (Triandafyllidou et al. 2009:243) by the Norwegian government, which does not accept responsibility for creating the crisis, only for solving it. Not only do the mainstream media go free of escalating the crisis, but by accepting this version, Muslim leaders go free as well. The imam‟s compliant attitude towards the government can also be understood in a historical context of previous debates in the media where imams have been put on the defensive and turned into scapegoats. In order to understand the imam‟s desire to calm things down, we also need to take the international context into account. The cartoon affair had already developed into an international crisis, and Norway may never before have been the object of so much negative attention on the international stage. The article appeared on the day before the Norwegian Embassy in Damascus was burned down, but Norwegian (and Danish) flags had been burned in protests in a number of Muslim countries, primarily in the Middle East, for several weeks already. While burning the American flag in protests has been common also in Norway, there have only been a few occasions where the Norwegian flag has been burned. The Islamic Council advises against The leader of the Islamic Council Norway, which represents most Norwegian mosques, Mohammed Hamdan, is quoted in Dagsavisen 6 February; We know about the plans to demonstrate and have told our youth that this must be done peacefully and not end up with violence or incidents. If violence occurs, it will only help the extremists. Apparently, Hamdan does not advise against the demonstration, only recommends that it is done peacefully. However, linguistic analysis shows that he is using several strategies characteristic of discriminatory discourse. First, the strategy of „enageing‟ (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:48) when referring to the prospective protestors as „our youth‟, but also expresses authority (and perhaps ownership?) by using the term „our‟. He speaks with an explicit assumption that „violence‟ may occur (see above on the stereotype of violent Muslims), and in case it does, „it will only help the extremists‟. In this phrase, we can identify a topos of threat; if an action bears certain threatening consequences, one should not do it, or as the fallacy of argumentum ad baculum (“threatening with the stick”) (ibid. p. 71). More specifically, and as Reisigl and Wodak (2001:77) point out, this can be identified as a topos of threat of racism; with the implication that minorities should not protest against racism because it could cause more racism, which is a victim-victimiser reversal (ibid.). Finally, the term „extremists‟ is an example of the referential and predicational strategy of social problematization or negative ideologization (ibid. p. 52). It is not entirely clear who he labels „extremists‟ but we may 7 reasonably interpret the term within the dominant ideological position as „extremists on both sides‟ – presumably including neo-Nazis, Vebjørn Selbekk, and “Islamists”. Dagsavisen 11 February brings an article with the headline Boycotting the demonstration, followed by the ingress; Muslims no longer have any reason to demonstrate after Vebjørn Selbekk‟s regret. It reports that the day before, in connection with the „reconciliation meeting‟, the Islamic Council held a press conference where they made an, according to the newspaper, “unusually clear” statement; We advise against participating in demonstrations not backed by any responsible organization. The leader, Mohammed Hamdan, said; This applies to the demonstration that has been called via SMS. Some are likely to be upset that we advise against participation, but we represent 46 religious organizations in Norway when we say no. Hamdan here invokes the topos of numbers (ibid. p. 79), which is a fallacious argument when incorrectly assuming that the ‟46 religious organizations‟ actually represent the views of the majority of Norwegian Muslims, a presumption that cannot be verified empirically. Ikhlaq Ahmad, Abbas Nazar Hussain and Muhammad Jamil associated with the Islamic Cultural Center are quoted, Everything is forgiven. We will not like it if anyone from our congregation shows up for the demonstration at Grønlands Torg. Those who show up are not serious Muslims. The quote contains the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem, which is a verbal attack on the antagonist‟s personality and character (discrediting them as „not serious Muslims‟) instead of trying to refute the arguments (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:72). At the end of the article, it says: If Ikhlaq Ahmad and his friends at the Islamic Cultural Center get what they want, the police will not have to watch out for anything. Their hope is that there will not be any more people at Grønlands Torg than on an ordinary Saturday afternoon in February. Ahmad is quoted; Our prophet has taught us that it is human to make mistakes. If someone regrets, others should forgive. When God forgives, humans should also forgive. Thus, we accept Selbekk‟s regret and thank him for admitting that he made a mistake. […] Those who do not accept the regret are not serious. They cannot remember the prophet‟s message. Ahmad uses an argumentum ad verecundiam, which is a misplaced appeal to deep respect and reverence for authorities, in the last sentence, „they cannot remember the prophet‟s message‟. Reisigl and Wodak (2001:72) write that, an “appeal to an authority is always fallacious […] if she or he is quoted inaccurately”. In this case, the Prophet‟s message is not quoted literally, and while Prophet Mohammed taught to forgive, he also taught to fight against injustice. Political pressure on Muslim leaders Dagsavisen‟s article after the demonstration, on 12 February, carries the headline, -Politicians put pressure on the imams, and reports that the organizers of the demonstration indicated that political pressure was the reason the imams had asked people to stay away from the demonstration. Organizer and speaker at the rally, Roqayya Kalaycy, is quoted: We chose to go anyway. The politicians try to influence the mosque communities far too much, and we do not like that. An unnamed representative of the Islamic Council, however, rejects that they were pressured by politicians. The person is quoted saying, we operate independent of politicians. No politicians participate when we have meetings and make our decisions. While the organizers claimed that imams were pressured by politicians, the imam rejects this with reference to formal procedures. But pressure works of course also discursively and informally, including through the media. Journalist Wasim K. Riaz writes in a commentary in Aften, 16 February 2006, under the headline Imams on the defensive, that Norwegian imams cooperated with Norwegian authorities from day one to solve the issue quietly. No one doubts that the imams‟ efforts have calmed down the conflict. But the imams, who managed to reach an agreement with Norwegian authorities and accepted the regret from Magazinet, did not manage to reach an 8 agreement with their own. Riaz thinks that, now the imams should thank those who defied them, because, for years, the imams have been criticized by Norwegian authorities, politicians and by their own for so to speak every single negative act committed by a Muslim. But, now it turns out that the same imams do not have as much power over the Muslims as politicians and media would have it. When more than 1000 Muslims publicly defy the imams and the Islamic Council, there is reason to believe that several thousand Norwegian Muslims put their own thoughts and ideas higher than what an imam says. Only naïve politicians believe that the imam is everything in a Muslim‟s life. This means that the open disagreement between Muslim leaders and Muslim youth actually helped break down one central myth about the Muslim community – that ordinary Muslims blindly obey their religious leaders. Fear of racist violence among Norwegian Muslims On Saturday, 4 February 2006, two events took place that help explain the strong sense of fear that reached its peak during the following week (see also Triandafyllidou et al. 2009:239240). Demonstrators in Damascus burned down the Norwegian Embassy, and later that evening, possibly as an act of revenge, a „man of Palestinian origin‟ was stabbed by two young „men of Norwegian origin‟ in Skien. Although one of the “ethnic Norwegian” men said “Why do you burn our flag in the Middle East?” during the attack, the police sees the incident as a drunken row rather than as an act of racism (see Varden, 6 February 2009). Leader of the Antiracist Center, Nadeem Butt, however, says in Dagsavisen 6 February that the incident in Skien frightens Norwegian Muslims, and that the Islamic Council also received death threats from right-wing extremists. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg says in the same newspaper that he is worried and afraid that what he calls extreme forces on both sides will flourish. The burning of the embassy increased a pre-existing fear of Muslim extremists (usually referred to as „Islamists‟) among majority Norwegians, and the Islamophobic feeling of Norway and the rest of Europe being besieged by Muslims probably gained ground. On the other hand, Norwegian Muslims also feared the extreme right. Mohammed Hamdan, leader of the Islamic Council, says in Dagsavisen; Now that a man has been stabbed, I am of course scared that extreme-right groups will turn to violence and do more than just making threats. Let us now look at how the fear that is explicitly expressed by two Norwegian Muslim individuals is reported in an article related to the upcoming demonstration. VG online 6 February brings a dramatic headline; Norwegian Muslim leaders fear a mass battle, followed by the ingress, Muslim leaders have tried to stop a demonstration in Oslo organized by the unknown group “The Volunteers” for fear of violent clashes. While the headline presents a horror scenario of a „mass battle‟ and „violent clashes‟. It is not clear who would actually fight out this battle, but it may reasonably be inferred that it is the beforementioned „extremists on both sides‟, i.e. neo-Nazis vs. Islamists. Implicitly, without saying it directly, the ingress in effect constructs The Volunteers and their planned demonstration, which had previously been presented positively in the same newspaper, as a party to a possible „violent clash‟, emphasizing the organizers‟ anonymity („unknown‟) and thus activating a general „fear of the unknown‟. The actual content of the article, also this time written by Kadafi Zaman, does not follow up the dramatic expectations created in the headline. This article also illustrates an important point about media – that journalists do not necessarily write the headline and ingress. The content is mostly about rumors on the internet that the neo-Nazi group Vigrid (which is small, but running for Parliament for the first time in 2009, without realistic chances of winning seats) is planning a counter-demonstration where they would burn the Koran in front of the Muslim protesters. After these neo-Nazi threats, leader of the Antiracist Center, Nadeem Butt, leader of the Islamic Association, Basim Ghozlan, and deputy leader of the Islamic Council, Senaid Kobilica, advise Muslims against gathering at Grønlands Torg on Saturday. Butt justifies his 9 advice saying; We must not contribute to being presented as extremists. Now we have to calm this down. We have in the last few days received several signals that right-extremists are mobilizing their forces. The first sentence is an example of the fallacy of argumentum ad consequentiam (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:74), where one points to the consequences of an act without disputing the rightness of the act itself, as well as another example of the abovementioned topos of threat, victim-victimiser reversal and the topos of threat of racism. Nadeem Butt does not dispute that protesting is the right thing to do, but argues that it should not be done because of the threat of possible consequences. While Norwegian Muslims have not confronted neo-Nazis before, there are left-wing groups that have a long tradition of fighting neo-Nazis in street battles. While clashes between antiracists and extreme-right groups have taken place regularly in Oslo over the last few decades, the first time Muslim youth took part in political riots in Oslo was in 2009 in a joint protest with left-wing groups against Israel‟s war in Gaza. The caution taken by Norwegian Muslim leaders may be attributed to the strong generalized sense of fear and distrust that prevailed at the time. Although the Prime Minister refers to “extreme forces on both sides” and calls for dialogue, in the prevailing climate of „clash of civilizations‟ the average white non-Muslim Norwegian would probably perceive Muslim protesters as the bigger threat than the neo-Nazis. According to this reasoning, the extreme right has more to gain (including sympathy and support from the general public) from a possible clash than the Muslims have. As it turned out, the Nazis were paper tigers and nowhere to be seen, while 1500 Muslims held a peaceful protest against media racism. Majority fear of unknown organizers On 11 February, Dagbladet online also invokes the „fear of the unknown‟ in an article with the headline Fearing a faceless prophet-demo, followed by the ingress; Police refuses to say who has called for today‟s demonstration against the drawings of the prophet Mohammed. By highlighting the anonymity of the organizers through the word “faceless”, the newspaper plays on the public‟s fear of the unknown and contributes to make majority Norwegians suspicious of the protest. Aslam Ahsan, head of the Association for Pakistani Children, a man whose political views are usually closer to typical majority than minority positions is quoted saying, I will most strongly advise anyone against participating in the announced demonstration because it is faceless and frameless. In this tense situation, this may be scary. Ahsan here contributes to the fear of the unknown. Already in Dagsavisen 6 February, he was quoted, I strongly appeal to Norwegian Muslims not to participate. With further confrontations and demonstrations, the unrest will only continue. This is another example of argumentum ad baculum or the topos of danger and threat. Dagbladet 11 February has however found out about the organizers that they are, not a homogenous group that insists to demonstrate despite the warnings. It is allegedly a mix of young people of Pakistani, Kurdish, Somali and Moroccan background calling themselves “The Volunteers”. Dagbladet uses the term „warning‟ with an implicit reference to some kind of danger, and the term „insist‟ which implies a negative attribution of stubbornness to the prospective protestors. The newspaper claims they contacted a person they assumed to be one of the organizers, and the person threatened to report the newspaper to the police for harassment if they called again. Farid Bouras at the organization “Youth Against Violence” is quoted with the following comment; The reason for the rejecting attitude is probably that they think the media is to blame for disseminating the Mohammed drawings which they think offends their beliefs. Bouras uses several mitigating terms like „probably‟ and twice „they think‟ to distance himself from the protestors‟ position and make it clear that he does not share their position. Like Ahsan, Bouras is one of those minority persons who tends to agree with hegemonic views and do not challenge them. It is remarkable that the media repeatedly 10 interviews these individuals who are otherwise marginal to the caricature issue, but the fact may illustrate that the media prefers to speak to persons who hold dominant views, and that those who hold other views, are reluctant to speak to the media because their views are often misrepresented (Gullestad 2006:48-67). Police inspector Johan Fredriksen uses more neutral and bureaucratic language when he says in Dagbladet 11 February; We have a policy not to inform about it [who has applied for permission to demonstrate] because those who arrange the demonstration own their message and their own audience. We have a dialogue with the organizer and agree on what framework that should apply. This is how we make the organizers responsible and maintain freedom of expression. The police inspector uses terms such as „dialogue‟, „agree[ment]‟, „responsib[ility]‟ and „freedom of expression‟, which reflect the dominant ideological position of the government. He continues; We hope the reconciliation contributes to make our job easier. However, we are aware that this is a tense situation, but so far there are no indications of trouble. We don‟t have an enemy image of the organizer. In this quote, he again uses positive terms like „reconciliation‟ and „easier‟. The last sentence is an example of positive self-presentation („we don‟t have an enemy image‟) and negative other presentation in his implied acknowledgement that some unspecified other has „an enemy image‟. As it is the responsibility of the police to maintain public order, it is in their interest to give the impression that they are „in control‟ and tone down the possibility of a disturbance of public order. At the same time, the police has been criticized for contributing to an enemy image of Muslims on several previous occasions, and may have wanted to avoid this on this occasion. Already on 6 February, Deputy Police Chief Roy Henry Nilsen makes an interesting statement in Dagsavisen; If the congregations support the demonstration, it will probably go well. I am not afraid that a demonstration here in Oslo will get out of control. It is not immediately clear why he sees the backing from Muslim religious organizations as a condition for the protest to be carried out peacefully. Linguistically, however, Nilsen employs the topos of authority; an action may be performed because an authority says it may (ibid. p. 79). Having identified the issue of authority, we may interpret the statement within a general context of Norwegian authorities‟ preference for and over-reliance on community leaders rather than ordinary Muslim individuals. Similar to the spokesperson in the media discussed above, there has been a tendency among the Norwegian public to deal with Norwegian Muslims through their “representatives” – either unofficial spokespersons, or formal leaders of organizations (see also the discussion above on „managerial multiculturalism‟). THE PEACE DEMONSTRATION 10 FEBRUARY In an article headlined, White and broad for respect and dialogue, Klassekampen 10 February announces the gathering initiated by the Antiracist Center outside the main railway station the same afternoon. The headline itself is an interesting example for linguistic analysis. The racializing referential term „white‟ can be seen as a metaphor (since „white‟ people do not literally have „white‟ skin, a synechdoche, where a part stands for a whole, as there were some non-white persons present as well, and a metonym, where one name of a referent (for example, „(ethnic) Norwegian‟ or „non-Muslim‟ is replaced with another („white‟). Further, the term „white‟ is combined with three positive attributes, „broad‟, „respect‟ and „dialogue‟. Reisigl and Wodak (2001:58) point out that in discourses about „races‟, „nations‟ and „ethnicities‟, the racializing metaphors, metonyms and synechdoches are almost always connected with dichotomic, oppositional predications that help polarize and divide the world. In the above example, it may be inferred that the opposite end of the binary consists of „narrow-minded Muslims who are confrontational and show disrespect‟ (for example for the freedom of expression). It is reported that the demonstration emphasizes “the need for 11 dialogue, respect, peace and non-violent conflict resolution”. Who is the demonstration directed against? Again, we may assume the „extremists on both sides‟, but different audiences may interpret this differently. While a non-Muslim audience is probably more likely to think of Muslim extremists than about racists, the situation is different for Norwegian Muslims like Nadeem Butt: For the first time, many people who have never before been scared, including me, ask ourselves whether we have a safe future here in Norway. Klassekampen writes; He says that in his 30 years in Norway, he has never before experienced such a widespread fear among Muslims of what might face them if the conflict associated with the caricatures continues to escalate. Given the prevailing Eurocentric hegemony, the majority of Norwegians is unlikely to be aware of this widespread fear of racist hate crimes among Norwegian Muslims, although the only reported violent incident on Norwegian territory during the crisis was committed by a white Norwegian against a Muslim. Discursive struggle within the majority: freedom of expression or dialogue? Dagsavisen 11 February reports from this demonstration as follows: Finance Minister Kristin Halvorsen and integration minister Bjarne Håkon Hanssen took the lead in the demonstration for peace, freedom of expression and religious respect. The peace demonstration that was supposed to unite the citizens of Oslo across religions yesterday afternoon, was dominated by white Norwegians. Among the 60 organizations that supported the demonstration, none were Muslim. The leader of the Antiracist Center was disappointed that Muslim organizations did not support the event… The quoted text is a prime example of positive self-presentation as it contains a number of positive attributes, „lead‟, „peace‟, „freedom of expression‟, „religious respect‟, and „unite‟ to describe the group „dominated by white Norwegians‟ and led by two cabinet ministers and supported by ‟60 organizations‟. The demonstration may thus be interpreted as the Norwegian government and civil society‟s self-congratulatory celebration of its allegedly liberal and tolerant values. In this context, it is of course „disappoint[ing]‟ that Muslim organizations did not support the event. The absence of Norwegian Muslim organizations from this demonstration may be interpreted as their own act of subtle defiance! Klassekampen and Dagsavisen use the term “white” to describe the demonstration. This term can be misleading since the main organizer Nadeem Butt is a Norwegian Pakistani. A slippage of meaning between racializing, nationalizing, politicizing and ethnicizing referential terms, where Muslim = minority = immigrant, and on the other hand, Norwegian = ethnic Norwegian = white = non-Muslim, is widespread in Norwegian media, and may be referred to by the linguistic term metonym, which means renaming. Because the hegemonic discourse bans the use of the term „race‟ in Scandinavia as in German-speaking countries, the new racism usually simply replaces the term „white‟ with culturalizing term „Western‟, but maintains the same hierarchical opposition. The term „white‟ however has returned in order to criticize the lack of inclusion of minorities in a given context, and when the journalists describe the demonstration as „white‟ it may be seen as a criticism of the lack of Muslim presence. The absence of Muslims however, is not blamed on exclusionary „white‟ discursive practice, but on the Muslims‟ unwillingness to „integrate‟. Even Aften‟s minority journalist Wasim Riaz writes (8 February) that, some Norwegians support the Muslim protest, with reference to the International Socialists. Are Norwegian Muslims not Norwegians, then? The use of such terms risks reproducing the dichotomy between „us‟ and „them‟, but it also reflects a social reality where there is a correlation between skin color, religion and political perspectives. As antiracist research emphasizes, skin color, especially if it correlates with religion, is an important determinant of the experience of racism, or on the majority side, the experience of white privilege. These experiences also influence one‟s political perspectives. In the case of the demonstrations, the problem is not only about segregating language on the discursive level, but the two demonstrations also point to a problem of actual 12 segregation. The “whiteness” of Friday‟s demonstration is perhaps not primarily a problem because of the small number of Muslim participants, but because the ideological position expressed in this demonstration is Eurocentric and does not reflect Muslim perspectives. Eurocentric politicians Dagbladet (11 February, print version) reports with the disappointed headline; Only 300 for peace, quoting a crowd estimate from the police. The article quotes extensively from the finance minister‟s speech, which is remarkably explicit and clear in its construction of „us‟ and „them‟ and her political perspective. Kristin Halvorsen said: We Norwegians are used to be regarded as peaceful and welcome. Now we are threatened, she said, and emphasized the importance of not letting a minority of extremists set the agenda. – 100 persons threw stones at the Norwegian embassy in Tehran. We have to remember that there live at least ten million people in Tehran who did not join the attack. And if a small minority tries to harass Muslims in Norway, we must remember that 4.5 million people do not wish to do the same. She starts with the referential term that combines a collectivizing deictic („we‟) and a nationym or ethnonym („Norwegians‟), and links these directly to two positive attributes, „peaceful‟ and „welcome‟. She is here giving a positive self-presentation on behalf of the nation, but at this point it is not entirely clear who is included in this nation. However, when analyzing further what characteristics she attributes to the in-group; it becomes clear that these are the perspectives and feelings of non-Muslim Norwegians. The phrase „are used to be regarded‟ as „peaceful and welcome‟ is a reflection of what non-Muslim Norwegians have taken for granted (it is unlikely that the majority of Norwegian Muslims shares this sentiment), but it is no longer the case, because „now we are threatened‟. As discussed earlier, Norwegian Muslims also feel threatened (by right-wing extremists), but this is not the primary threat the minister has in mind inn the next sentence: „100 persons threw stones at the Norwegian Embassy in Tehran‟. She tries to construct herself as neutral, in line with the ideological position of dialogue and reconciliation, through the argumentation strategy of scapegoating: she blames „a minority of extremists‟. She also mentions extremists on „our‟ side as an afterthought („and if a small minority tries to harass Muslims in Norway‟), which contains several mitigating terms: „if‟, „small‟, „minority‟, „tries‟. In terms of discourse representation and perspectivation, she distances herself from Norwegian Muslim complaints about widespread racism, and this is in effect a denial of racism, especially in her fallacious claim that „4.5 million [i.e. almost the entire population] do not wish to do the same‟ – a claim that appears empirically incorrect in light of widespread Islamophobia in the media. It should also be noted that she uses the referential term „Muslims in Norway‟ rather than „Norwegian Muslims‟. This also supports the interpretation that she does not include Norwegian Muslims in the in-group. In his study of British newspapers, John Richardson (2004:113) found a similar split between „Islam‟ and „the West‟ where British Muslims were not included among „us‟ British, although, according to Triandafyllidou et al. (2009:258-259), British newspapers avoided dichotomies and included British Muslim views to a larger extent. While the demonstration was intended to build bridges, the finance minister operates with a distinction between „we Norwegians‟ and „Muslims‟, and although she tries to put the blame for the conflict on „a minority of extremists‟, there is an explicit fear and implicit assumption of a possible „clash of civilizations‟ at the same time as she plays down that antiMuslim racism is widespread far beyond „extremists‟ and that Muslim discontent with this situation is also widespread far beyond „extremists‟. In conclusion, her speech does not address the problem of racism nor reflect the perspectives of Norwegian Muslims at all. This is no surprise to minority Norwegians and probably one reason why the audience was predominantly white. We may nevertheless contrast Halvorsen‟s words with Butt‟s, as quoted in Dagsavisen: We Norwegians have together experienced the drawings of Mohammed here 13 in Norway, and the reactions in the Middle East. We have agreed that freedom of expression is a right we must use with good sense, and we have taken distance from burning our flag. Butt uses an inclusive “us”, while also reproducing the dominant ideology of the government. Dagsavisen further quotes Halvorsen‟s comment on the reconciliation: The way the leader of the Islamic Council accepted the regret, gives me hope. He and Selbekk have children of the same age, and Mohammed Hamdan wanted children to be friends. This is how we will create peace and reconciliation. In order words, the Norwegian government will create peace and reconciliation by making Muslim leaders accept what they say. This is fully in line with the foreign policy of dialogue, peace and reconciliation. The Norwegian government seems to attribute the problem only to Selbekk and Magazinet, a view with which Muslim community leaders appear to agree, while ignoring or even denying that large numbers of Muslims see Norwegian media and politicians in general as part of the problem. Peace researcher Johan Galtung would point out that there are always more than two parties to a conflict, and it is key to include these when trying to create peace and reconciliation. Both newspapers report that the demonstration was peaceful with the exception of a minor incident where a groups from the extreme-right party, the Democrats (a break-away from the Progress Party), led by former member of parliament Jan Simonsen, carrying posters saying; Freedom of expression has its cost – for Theo van Gogh it was his life, Defend freedom of expression, and Fight the denial of the holocaust. It was reported that two leftist activists attacked them, spit Simonsen in the face and destroyed their posters. This demonstration perhaps illustrates business as usual in white Norway: Peaceful, but politically uninteresting as no one challenges hegemony. Politicians and non-government organizations are well-represented, joined by “ethnic Norwegians” who agree. Few minority persons attend, and those who do, also agree. Mariette Lobo comments in Gnisten (no. 4/2007, The Antiracist Center took the initiative for a march where minister Bjarne Håkon Hanssen and Carl I. Hagen participated. The march was supposed to show that Muslims in Norway are peaceful. The next day there was another march with a much clearer message: Stop the demonization of Muslims. Let us look into the coverage of the Muslim protest. THE MUSLIM DEMONSTRATION 11 FEBRUARY The demonstration was covered in Aftenposten, Dagsavisen, Dagbladet and VG. All reported that about 1500 persons participated in the march from Grønlands Torg to Parliament. Mostly, they were referred to with the political actionalizing term „demonstrators‟ rather than with the culturalizing religionym „Muslims‟. Dagbladet online quotes Unni Grøndahl, information chief at the Oslo Police District, saying there were about 1500 participants. Since crowd estimates given by the police are usually conservative, and often lower than figures claimed by organizers and sympathizers, we can assume that there were about 1500, perhaps more, participants. In some aspects, the articles are strikingly similar: Aftenposten‟s headline describes the demonstration as Calm, but loud, and emphasizes that the demonstration had taken place without any incidents of violence. Dagsavisen also describes the demonstration as loud, but peaceful, and quotes Tor Langli at the Oslo Police saying: - We are very satisfied with the organizers. Both articles use the term „loud‟ to describe the demonstrators, a term that is often found as a negative attribute in racist discourse (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:55). Aftenposten‟s article notes that: Right-wing extremists had in advance announced counterdemonstrations, but a formidable police force followed the demonstration. Mounted police and commando cars flanked the march, anti-terror patrols were positioned in strategic places and large amounts of civilian-clothes officers with earplugs mixed with the crowd. The strong focus on the police attendance strengthens the perception that this was something that could come out of control, although the police were not worried in advance. 14 Orientalist stereotypes The coverage of the demonstration contains several stereotypes from Orientalist discourse, where „the West‟ constructs itself through „the Other‟ (Richardson 2004:15), and ascribes to Islam the „undesirable opposites‟ of „Western values‟ (p.18). John Richardson identified several topoi of threat in Islamophobic discourse, including the threat of Muslim extremism (ibid. p.78), Islam as a threat to democracy (ibid. p. 85) and the threat of Muslim gender inequality (ibid. p. 89). The coverage of the demonstration contains several of these topoi. Dagbladet online writes among other things that, The demonstrators defied the great imams‟ request not to participate, and shouted “allahu akbar” (“allah is the greatest”) through the entire center of Oslo. Dagsavisen also refers to the place of women and shouting: After several speeches, the crowd, with the men in front and the women at the back in a separate section, marched to Parliament. “Allah u akbar” – God is great – was rhythmically shouted by the angry protestors. Aftenposten however, reports that the women went in front, while loudly praising Allah and the Prophet Mohammed. Dagbladet online writes in the ingress, Women marched at the back of the demonstration. This claim is partially supported with a picture, showing a group of women together, but which tells us nothing about whether there were women elsewhere in the march. In Dagbladet‟s print version, the ingress reads: Five times as many joined yesterday‟s protest march compared to Friday‟s reconciliation march. And at the back, for themselves, were the women. Under a picture of a group of veiled women, it says: About 100 women marched in a separate section at the tail end of the parade. It says further: At the front marched Saleh Abdolbasset. He shouted loudly and waved with the Koran. This is a common stereotype of “the Muslim Other”, shouting loudly and waving the Koran. However, he is quoted saying: - We are marching here to show that the prophet is previous to us. We respect everyone, both those with and those without religion. Several newspapers describe the demonstrators as „shouting allahu akbar‟, which connotes both religious extremism and implicitly constructs the demonstrators as uncivilized, although shouting is quite common in all kinds of demonstrations. The references to the segregation and oppression of women are explicit („at the back‟, „in a separate section‟) and are also an example of a hasty generalization when a picture of a small group of women is used to argue that „women‟ in general were in a separate section at the back. The example of the place of women also employs the topos of humanitarianism or justice, which states that if it (segregating women) does not conform to human rights or justice (gender equality), one should not do it (Reisigl & Wodak 2001:77). Dagbladet‟s article also employs the topoi of Islam as a threat to democracy when reporting, When the demonstrators gathered at Grønlands Torg, a group of demonstrators attempted the take over the event. They were quickly put in place by the demonstrators‟ own guards. A few were wearing masks. Kalaycy is quoted with the following comment: - I don‟t like it. They are young and their blood boils a little sooner. This group allegedly did not want to follow democratic rules for a demonstration, and had to be controlled by the organizer. Two bystanders with Norwegian names (named by the newspaper) are also quoted: - It is frightening that it doesn‟t take more than some drawings to start all this. The article continues: But the demonstration was peaceful. The demonstrators‟ own security guards quickly claimed down those who became agitated. Police attended with horses, several commando cars and a helicopter. Except from a policeman who slipped on the ice and severely hit his head, everyone had a calm day at work. The way this is written, it seems like a surprise that everything went calmly. The text of Dagbladet‟s article gives a predominantly negative impression (unless one sees the non-occurrence of expected violent incidents as something positive), and there are no extensive quotes or interviews where participants get a chance to explain their message. Descriptions such as these reflect stereotypes and classify the event with a widespread 15 perception of (fanatic) Muslims, “loudly shouting Allah Akbar” and keeping women in a separate section. While these things also take place, the newspapers could choose an alternative emphasis, for example like Gnisten, which focuses on the protest against racism. The contradictory reports on the place of women are interesting, as several journalists probably tried to confirm their own assumptions about conservative Muslim women being segregated from men. In an article in the International Socialists‟ magazine Gnisten no. 4/2007 (August), Mariette Lobo comments on the demonstration, Media discredited the demonstration. Instead of taking seriously the message that printing the caricature drawings was Islamophobia and not about freedom of expression, newspapers wrote that women were forced to march at the tail end of the parade. Talk about confirming prejudice. In reality, the demonstration was led by a woman, and women could march wherever they wanted. There may have been a women‟s section at the back, but other reports indicate that women were also present elsewhere in the march, including among the organizers and public speakers! In this regard, the demonstration was no different from the annual Norwegian May 1 marches, where the women‟s organizations are always placed towards the tail end, although there are of course many women present in other sections as well. Protest against blasphemy or racism? From the many pictures in the newspapers, both in print and online, we can identify a large number of slogans on posters. The list counts more than 20 different slogans, which indicates that the organizers had planned well and knew that this was an opportunity both to get a more nuanced message across and at the same time show the diversity of opinions among Norwegian Muslims. Probably they expected to be misrepresented in the media, so if the articles would not quote their words, the photographs would at least quote their posters. The posters reveal a great variety of slogans, ranging from those phrased in a language of religious truth, via those phrased in a political language of freedom of religion, to slogans about mutual respect in a multicultural society. Many are directed specifically at the media, and some call for responsibility in using freedom of expression. In a religious language of truth: Islam is the truth We condemn the lies about the prophet When truth comes, lies disappear Lies end, truth doesn‟t In a political language of respect for religion: Freedom to practice one‟s religion Respect our faith, then you respect us! Peace and respect for our values Values exist because they are valuable For mutual respect in a multicultural society: Directed specifically at the media: Muslims demand protection against harassment and bullying Stop the war! Stop the racist harassment! Do you want a sweet life? Stop making it sour for others! Building a good society takes time, tearing it down takes seconds Shame on you, media, for harassing and spreading hatred Media, stop terrorizing us and our lives Stop harassing and spreading hatred Media, mouthpiece of lies Politicians and media, this is the result of your irresponsibility For responsible use of freedom of expression: Your freedom of expression ends the moment you step on my feet What we witness now, is the result of misused freedom of expression The caricatures are lying, freedom of expression is to say the truth 16 The large number of slogans shows the diversity of opinions among Norwegian Muslims, that they do not speak with only one voice, although the overall message is quite clear. While a few slogans are explicitly religious, others are phrased in terms of respect for religion. Some slogans focus on mutual respect in a multicultural society, while many slogans specifically criticize the media‟s representation of Muslims, several of them ask for responsible use of freedom of expression. Judging from the posters, this was primarily a protest against the demonization of Muslims in the media, that is, a political protest against racism, although religious arguments were also present. The relationship between these two ideological positions may be understood in the light of Jürgen Habermas‟s (2005) discussion of the need for religious citizens to translate religious arguments into secular ones when participating in public discourse, with a corresponding responsibility for secular citizens to cooperate and “open their minds to the possible truth content” and “even enter into dialogues from which religious reasons then might emerge in the transformed guise of generally accessible arguments” (ibid. p. 16). In our case, Norway is a highly secularized society where the religious argument against blasphemy is not taken seriously. While the older generation of Muslim leaders, including religious authorities, may reason primarily within a religious discourse, the younger generation born and raised in secular Norway, is more likely to phrase their protest against „insults against the prophet‟ in a political language of freedom of religion, respect for minorities and racism. Aftenposten 12 February quotes one of the speakers outside Parliament, Sehraz Anjeem: We would like to be protected against the insults and harassment that has affected us in recent weeks. The newspaper adds that he wanted the dormant blasphemy paragraph to be revived to protect Muslims against religious harassment. Dagsavisen 12 February does not quote from the speeches outside Parliament, but notes that, it was said that Muslims had been attacked by the media after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, and the demonstrators demanded that Parliament protects Muslims by reviving the dormant blasphemy paragraph. These two articles give us a relatively narrow presentation of the demonstrators‟ message. Focus is on the caricatures of Mohammed as blasphemy in recent weeks, with only a vague quote indicating that the negative media presentation of Muslims had been going on since 9/11. With both ideological positions (against blasphemy and against racism) present, it appears that the media prefers to quote the religious arguments that can easily be dismissed in secular society, rather than the political argument about racism that is harder to refute. VG‟s online article 11 February also quotes Sehraz Anjeem about the blasphemy paragraph, but is more nuanced. The headline, - Respect our values, is a quote from one of the organizers‟, Roqayya Kalayci, speech outside Parliament. After the demonstration, she tells VG in an interview: We held this demonstration because we wanted the voice of Norwegian Muslims to be heard. We wanted our voice to be heard, and that our lives and values be protected and respected. Kalayci is further quoted: We have faced a lot of difficulties, and there have been many who have wanted us not to hold this demonstration. But we think it is important that ordinary Muslims get to say their opinion. I am satisfied with our demonstration. VG also quotes one of the other speakers, Abdul Latif: You may wonder why we are here. Can we not accept an apology? Yes, we accept the regret, but we demonstrate against how media deliberately puts Muslims in a negative light. We feel harassed, and we are here because we demand that Norway tolerates us. He also said: People who have come here, have received food, money and help. We have nothing against you. We thank everyone who has welcomed us, and we thank Norwegians who listen to us today. VG‟s online articles appear to give more voice to minority persons, contrary to what one may expect of a rightwing tabloid. However, VG is a populist newspaper that is more inclined to hear the voices of ordinary people rather than those of politicians. Mainstream media in Norway are usually loyal to official government policy, to the extent that Solveig Steien (2007:46)‟s analysis 17 showed that most newspaper editorials switched discourse on 10 February 2006; the day of the government‟s “reconciliation meeting”. Up to then they insisted on freedom of expression as absolute; after this date, they emphasized the need for dialogue. Support from non-Muslims In the days leading up to the demonstration, several newspapers reported that the International Socialists, as the only organization, publicly supported the Muslim demonstration. Aften 8 February carries the headline, Supports controversial demonstration, followed by the ingress, despite warnings, the young Muslims are determined to go through with the demonstration on Saturday. The International Socialists in Oslo support them and want to join. The article, written by a journalist with minority background, Wasim Riaz, reports that several members of the board of Rahma Islamic Relief Found Norway are among the organizers. It says: When Aften spoke to one of the initiative-takers yesterday, he said that he has to follow the strict guidelines in the group that prohibit talking to journalists. While it reported that there is an SMS campaign within the Muslim community to stop the demonstration, central board member of the International Socialists, Randi Færevik, is quoted saying; I think it is about time to show support for the Muslims in connection with what happened – including the war in Iraq and the stabbing of a Muslim in Skien after the caricature drawings were printed. In Klassekampen on 10 February, Andreas Ytterstad, editor of International Socialist magazine “Gnisten” says in an interview: When some of the Muslims in Oslo dare to stand up against the harassment, they deserve full support. We share the Muslims‟ anger at the oppression they suffer, and we want to participate to call attention to the war and the racism that underlies this entire conflict. He points to the wider context, where political conflicts are converted into a war of religions, and emphasizes the necessity of dealing with the political conflicts before one can attempt to have reconciliation and dialogue. Dagsavisen interviews Professor of Social Medicine, Per Fugelli, who had joined the Muslim protest. Fugelli is known for fronting controversial issues in public debate, and often defends the views of oppressed groups in society. The newspaper writes: While the overwhelming majority of yesterday‟s demonstrators had Muslim background, Per Fugelli, who professor in social medicine, was one of few with an ethnic Norwegian background who participated. Fugelli is quoted: I was there to show solidarity with Norwegian women and men who feel that their god and their dignity had been stepped on. There were many neighbors who participated, and they are people we have learned to appreciate. They deserve support when they feel that someone is bullying them. He thinks it is great that young people speak up when they have had enough: - It took courage and independence. The old authority figures were against the demonstration, and the larger Norwegian society feared violence. Nevertheless, they marched for what they believe in. One could see from those who marched, that it did them good, to be able to express their frustration after many years of feeling insulted had been suppressed. Fugelli stands out as one of few non-Muslim Norwegians, who publicly expressed empathy with the Muslims. He sees them as his neighbors and fellow Norwegians, people who deserved his support when they protested against being treated bad. Andreas Ytterstad (Klassekampen 23 February 2006) writes on behalf of the International Socialists: We were disappointed to see how few people from the Norwegian left who attended. And let‟s be honest, it was not because of the fear of unrest, neither was it any blind faith in the diplomatic skills of Jonas Gahr Støre. The left was hesitant to participate because they were influenced by the demonization of Islam. Ytterstad concludes, Hopefully, Muslims who do not unconditionally forgive Norway in exchange for a tiny bit a tolerance, will continue to demonstrate against the suffering they are caused. It is an unquestionable duty of socialists to support them. […] A condition for credible dialogue is solidarity – and participation in the struggle of the oppressed. 18 In an article covering the demonstration, Gnisten no. 2, 2006 interviews some of the participants in the demonstration. Wisam says: There are too few Norwegians here, while Naima Darazi says: I think turnout is too low from both ethnic Norwegians and Muslims. The negative media representation ahead of the demonstration, with its focus on fear and warnings against protesting, is probably an important reason for the low number of non-Muslim Norwegians who joined. The media‟s preference for reporting the religious argument against blasphemy, which is perceived as religious extremism in secular Norway, rather than the political argument for mutual respect and against racism, also contributed to make the protest suspect in the eyes of a largely secularized Norwegian public. Especially left-wing political groups could easily be mobilized against racism, but remain highly sceptical of religion. While the International Socialists were the only political group to see through this in 2006, a broader coalition of left-wing groups and Norwegian Muslim groups held a demonstration against Islamophobia in 2009. STRUGGLE FOR HEGEMONY BETWEEN IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak write that, “texts are often sites of social struggle” and “manifest traces of differing ideological fights for dominance and hegemony” (2009:89). Dominant ideologies appear as neutral, and “when most people in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget that there are alternatives to the status quo, we arrive at the Gramscian concept of hegemony” (Wodak & Meyer 2009:8). With these definitions in mind, we can identify four different ideological positions in the analyzed texts: CONSERVATIVE LIBERAL MAJORITY MINORITY 1. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AS RIGHT TO INSULT 2. CARICATURES AS BLASPHEMY 3. DIALOGUE BETWEEN EXTREMISTS ON BOTH SIDES RADICAL 4. CARICATURES IN BROADER CONTEXT OF RACISM Several discursive struggles can be identified: a. Initially: between 1 - Freedom of expression and 2 - Caricatures as blasphemy b. Within the majority: between 1 - Freedom of expression and 3 - Dialogue c. Within the minority: between 2 - Caricatures as blasphemy and 4. Caricatures as racism d. After demonstrations: between 3 - Dialogue and 4 - Caricatures as racism None of these ideological positions alone can be said to be hegemonic or dominant in Norway. Within the majority, there is an ongoing struggle for hegemony between two dominant ideologies - social democrats and liberals on one side, and what we might call “the new right” consisting of neo-nationalists, neoconservatives and neoliberals, where the former has gradually lost ground to the latter in the last two decades. Opinion polls indicate that the Norwegian population was evenly divides between supporting position 1 and 3. Each of these positions was backed by powerful elite groups; dialogue was the official position of the social democratic government, while confrontation was backed by the main opposition party, the Progress Party, which would have preferred Norway to act more like the Danish government. 19 Media coverage from Muslim countries and their representatives, and of Muslim religious organizations in Europe, initially gave the impression that it was all about blasphemy. Only after the “independent” demonstration, the fourth perspective was given public voice, although this view was also expressed by some researchers, intellectuals and left-wing groups. The International Socialists were the only political group in Norway, with the exception of a few intellectuals and researchers, who publicly identified the issue to be about racism. In several commentaries published in the media or in their own magazine, the International Socialists analyzed the various discourses and largely arrive at the same conclusions that I do here. Below, I have included some of their commentaries on the four ideological positions. 1. Freedom of expression as the right to insult The populist right, including those media which published the caricatures (in Norway, Magazinet with its editor Vebjørn Selbekk, and head of the Norwegian Press Association, Per Edgar Kokkvold, and the Progress Party) see freedom of expression as absolute, including the right to insult. Most Norwegian newspaper editors took a more pragmatic position, and did not print the cartoons in order not to escalate the conflict. Jon W. Sandven writes in a commentary in the International Socialists‟ magazine, Gnisten (no. 2, 2006), the liberal Norwegian elite that is now so eager to defend the right to insult a minority under pressure, presents freedom of expression as an absolute principle. 2. The caricatures as blasphemy Some Muslims see the caricatures as blasphemy and some of them would like it to be criminalized. In Norway, some Muslims called for the dormant law against blasphemy to be revived. Susan Lyden explains this (away) in a commentary in Gnisten, A racism paragraph exists, but is not used to stop the demonization. When anti-discrimination laws fail, it is perhaps not so strange that some Muslims have wanted to revive the blasphemy paragraph. 3. Dialogue between extremists on both sides “Dialogue between extremists on both sides” is the position of the Norwegian government, which leads a foreign policy of dialogue and takes on the role of a peace facilitator between the two discourses above. Most Norwegian media did not print the caricatures for pragmatic reasons, and expressed support for the dialogue position after the “reconciliation meeting, as did Norwegian Muslim leaders. In Susan Lyden‟s words, [the] Norwegian government […] want[s] reconciliation and dialogue. Imams and young Muslims are called to meetings, they have to accept “our” freedom of expression, refuse to support resistance shown by other Muslims, and pacify their own ranks. […] The dominant ideology is that only if minorities remain passive towards racist expressions, we can prevent an increase in racism. 4. The caricatures as part of a broader context of racism Many Muslims, however, interpreted the events in a much wider context of racism and imperialism. The Mohammed cartoons were the drop that made the cup run over, where the cup refers to the persistent demonization of Muslims in Western media that has accompanied US-led wars against Muslim countries. This ideological position gained access to the public through the demonstration on Saturday, 11 February. Only a few non-Muslim Norwegians supported this position, among them the International Socialists were the most vocal. Gnisten editor Andreas Ytterstad comments on the discursive struggle when he writes in an op-ed article in Klassekampen, 23 February, “The Volunteers” not only defied the imams with their demonstration. They also defied Norwegian authorities and leading Norwegian media. “When Selbekk and the leader of the Islamic Council can build bridges, everyone can,” Bjarne Håkon Hanssen said at the “reconciliation meeting” the day before 20 the demonstration. “Hey, let‟s remove the last drop of a Magazinet editor, and we forget the cup that runs over.” The media understood this hegemonic message. Dagsavisen wrote on the front page: “Muslims forgive Norway,” and let Islamic leaders ascertain that any Muslim who took part in the demonstration was not a “serious Muslim”. Jon W. Sandven writes at Gnisten, the caricatures cannot be seen as separate from the enemy image that has been created of Islam and Muslims after 11 September 2001. [Muslim minorities in the West are] demonized by both authorities and media. […] Islamophobia has become the most visible and “respectable” form of racism in the West after September 11. The drawings that depicted the prophet as a terrorist must be seen in this context. CONCLUSION My critical discourse analysis of selected newspaper articles covering the Muslim protest reveals a great number of linguistic features that are typical of racist discourse, including referential strategies dividing „us‟ (Norwegians) and „them‟ (Muslims), and predicational strategies attributing negative characteristics and traits to „Muslims‟ (Reisigl & Wodak 2001). Further, a number of argumentation strategies such as various topoi typical of anti-Muslim discourse have been identified, including positive self- and negative other-presentation and scapegoating (Triandafyllidou et al. 2009) as well as various topoi of threat (Richardson 2004). In terms of perspectivation, detachment and distancing from minority perspectives through mitigation strategies have been identified primarily in the public speech of prominent politicians, although there are also a number of example of involvement through direct quotation in discourse representation, primarily by minority journalists. Although the latter indicates that the coverage of the Muslim protest also gave public voice to Norwegian Muslim perspectives, we can conclude the coverage was heavily characterized by features of racist discourse. According to Peter Hervik (2004:152-153), three elements must be present before we can analytically conclude that racism is present in a given case. First, there must be dichotomy between „us‟ and „them‟, between those perceived to belong to the nation and those who do not, often „Muslims‟ in the new racism of the last two decades. The second analytical dimension is the inferiorization of the „other‟ by attributing to the „others‟ negative stereotypes that imply that „they‟ are „traditional‟, „less developed‟ or „uncivilized‟. These two dimensions have clearly been identified in my critical discourse analysis. However, a third dimension of power must be discussed. The Mohammed cartoon affair is a good example of the power of the media to first construct a crisis, and then in effect preventing majority Norwegians from joining Norwegian Muslims in a legitimate protest against racism by creating and sustaining fear of violence and suspicion of the organizers‟ agenda by letting prominent members of government misrepresent the protesters‟ ideological position as „extremist‟. We can thus conclude that “the Volunteers” and the International Socialists are right that the caricatures must not only be understood in the broader context of anti-Muslim racism, but that anti-Muslim racism is manifest even in the media coverage of Muslim protest against this kind of racism. We may conclude with quoting Susan Lyden: How can so many media persons, politicians, writers – and unfortunately also many left-wing activists – manage to believe that these drawings are made in a political vacuum? 21 LITERATURE Asad, Talal (2003): Formations of the Secular Eide, Elisabeth, Risto Kunelius and Angela Phillips (eds) (2009): Transnational media events. The Mohammed Cartoons and the Imagined Clash of Civilizations Gullestad, Marianne (2006): Plausible Prejudice Habermas, Jürgen (2005): Religion in the Public Sphere Hage, Ghassan (1998): White Nation Kunelius, Risto, E. Eide, O. Hahn & R. Schroeder (eds) (2007): Reading the Mohammed Cartoons Controversy Lobo, Mariette, “Profeten og proletariatet”, Gnisten, no. 4, 2007 Lyden, Susan, ”Dem” og ”oss” – det handler om rasisme, Gnisten no. 2, 2006 Reisigl, Martin, and Ruth Wodak (2001): Discourse and Discrimination. Rhetorics of racism and antisemitism Riaz, Wasim, ”Imamer på defensiven” (commentary), Aften, 16 February 2006 Richardson, John E. (2004): (Mis)Representing Islam. The racism and rhetoric of British broadsheet newspapers Sandven, Jon W., “Islamofobi er ordet, ikke ytringsfrihet”, Gnisten, no. 2, 2006 Steien, Solveig (2007): Norway. “A Norway almost at war” in R. Kunelius, El. Eide, O. Hahn & R. Schroeder (eds): Reading the Mohammed Cartoons Controversy Triandafyllidou, Anna, Ruth Wodak and Michal Krzyzanowski (eds.) (2009): The European Public Sphere and the Media. Europe in Crisis Wodak, Ruth (2008): “Introduction: Discourse Studies – Important Concepts and terms” in R. Wodak and M. Krzyzanowski (eds): Qualitative Discourse analysis in the social sciences Wodak, Ruth and Martin Reisigl (2009): “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) in R. Wodak & M. Meyer (eds): Methods of critical Discourse Analaysis. 2nd edition Wodak, Ruth and Michael Meyer (2009): “Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, theory, and methodology” in R. Wodak & M. Meyer (eds): Methods of critical Discourse Analysis. 2nd edition Ytterstad, Andreas, ”Muslimer og solidaritet” (op-ed article), Klassekampen, 23 February 2006 Newspaper articles ”Inviterer til demonstrasjon”, VG, 3 February 2006 (web) ”Norske muslimer vil demonstrere lørdag”, Dagsavisen, 6 February 2006 (print) ”Boikotter demonstrasjon”, Dagsavisen, 11 February 2006 (print) ”Støtter omstridt demonstrasjon”, Aften, 8 February 2006 (print) ”Norske venstreaktivister støtter demonstrasjon”, Klassekampen, 10 February 2006 (print) ”SV-lederen skrøt av Selbekk og Hamdan”, Dagsavisen, 11 February 2006 (print) ”Bare 300 for fred”, Dagbladet, 11 February 2006 (print) ”Norske muslimledere frykter masseslag”, VG, 6 February 2006 (web) ”Frykter ansiktsløs profet-demo”, Dagbladet, 11 February 2006 (web) ”- Respekter våre verdier”, VG, 11 February 2006 (web) ”Skam dere media”, Dagbladet, 11 February 2006 (web) ”Vi har ikke kastet første andre eller tredje stein…”, Dagbladet, 12 February 2006 (print) ”- Politikerne har presset imamene”, Dagsavisen, 12 February 2006 (print) ”Rolig, men høylydt”, Aftenposten, 12 February 2006 (print) 22 APPENDIX: The 14 newspaper articles analyzed Before the demonstration Articles, from VG (web), 3 February 2006, Dagsavisen (print), 6 February 2006 and 11 February 2006 23 Articles from Aften, 8 February 2006, Klassekampen, 10 February 2006, and Dagsavisen and Dagbladet, 11 February 2006 24 Online articles from Dagbladet, Saturday 11 February 2006, and VG, Monday 6 February 2006 25 After the demonstration Online articles from VG and Dagbladet, Saturday 11 February 2006 26 Articles from Dagbladet, Dagsavisen and Aftenposten, Sunday 12 February 2006 27